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LAW JOURNAL
THE IRRELEVANCE OF JURISDICTIONALITY IN FORT BEND
COUNTY V. DAVIS
Scott Dodson*

INTRODUCTION
For the last fifteen years or so, the Supreme Court has fixated on
questions involving the characterization of rules and statutes as
“jurisdictional.” The quest began in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, when the Court noted that jurisdiction “is a word of many,
too many, meanings.”1 Subsequent opinions have brought new attention and
thinking to questions of jurisdiction.2 The Court’s focus has undoubtedly
*

Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law and Associate Dean for
Research, UC Hastings College of the Law. This article is excerpted and adapted from an
amicus brief I filed in Fort Bend County v. Davis.
1
523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (quotation cleaned up).
2
See, e.g., Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13 (2017); United
States v. Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015); Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145
(2013); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012); Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428
(2011); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010); John R. Sand & Gravel Co.
v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 (2008); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007); Arbaugh
v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006); Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12 (2005) (per
curiam); Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443
(2004).
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had a salutary effect, especially in erecting a clearer framework for deciding
such jurisdictional-characterization questions.3
This laser-like focus on jurisdictionality, however, has had the
unfortunate, ancillary effect of distracting from important questions about
the particular effects of a rule or statute.4 In some cases, the question of
effects is actually the real question of relevance to the case, while the
jurisdictional-characterization question fades to irrelevancy. A recent case,
Fort Bend County v. Davis, illustrates why.
I. FORT BEND COUNTY FACTS
Lois Davis worked for Fort Bend County, Texas.5 She filed a complaint
with the county’s human-resources department alleging that the director of
her department sexually harassed and assaulted her. Although the director
resigned in the aftermath of the investigation, her direct supervisor, she
alleged, who was the director’s friend, began retaliating against her. One
day, she informed her supervisor that she could not work on a particular
Sunday because of a “previous religious commitment.” When she did not
show up that Sunday, she was fired.
Title VII requires prospective plaintiffs to exhaust their employmentdiscrimination claims with the EEOC or coordinate state agency prior to
filing a lawsuit in federal court.6 The exhaustion requirement is designed to
trigger administrative investigation and conciliatory procedures with an eye
toward non-judicial resolution.7 Accordingly, Davis filed an intake
questionnaire and a formal charge with the Texas Workforce Commission,
which is the state agency charged with enforcing federal and state
employment-discrimination laws.
3

See Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction and Its Effects, 105 GEO. L.J. 619, 621 (2017); Scott
Dodson, A Revolution in Jurisdiction, in THE LEGACY OF RUTH BADER GINSBURG 137
(Scott Dodson ed. 2015).
4
Elsewhere, I have argued that the Court’s attempt to divine Congress’s intent in
characterizing a rule or statute as jurisdictional is itself misplaced because the term
“jurisdictional” is definitional rather than positivist. See Scott Dodson, Defending
Jurisdiction, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 85, 90-94 (2018).
5
The facts in this section come from the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Davis v. Fort
Bend Cnty., 893 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 2018).
6
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
7
See Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788-89 (5th Cir. 2006).
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In her charge and questionnaire, she alleged sexual harassment and
retaliation based on the incidents with the director and her supervisor. While
her charge was still pending, she amended her intake questionnaire to add
the word “religion” in the box for “Employment Harms or Actions.” She
did not amend her formal charge. After investigation, the Commission
issued her a right-to-sue letter.
Davis then filed suit in federal district court asserting claims of both
retaliation and religious discrimination under Title VII. Fort Bend County
filed an answer but did not assert any defense based on exhaustion or
challenge exhaustion in any way. After discovery, Fort Bend County moved
for summary judgment on the merits, without mentioning exhaustion, and
the district court granted its motion. On appeal, Fort Bend County defended
the district court’s order solely on the ground that it was correct on the
merits. The Fifth Circuit reversed as to the religious-discrimination claim
and remanded for trial.
On remand, instead of proceeding to trial, Fort Bend County moved to
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and argued, for the first time,
that Davis failed to exhaust her religious-discrimination claim and that that
failure was a jurisdictional defect that required dismissal. The district court
agreed and dismissed.
Davis again appealed, and the Fifth Circuit reversed. The Fifth Circuit
held that the exhaustion requirement was not jurisdictional and that Fort
Bend County had forfeited the opportunity to raise it. Accordingly, the Fifth
Circuit remanded for trial.8 Fort Bend County sought certiorari on the
question whether the exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari on that question. In the Court, all parties
and all amici (save one) focused on the jurisdictional-characterization
question.
II. THE IRRELEVANCE OF JURISDICTIONALITY
Unfortunately, resolving this jurisdictional issue will not necessarily
resolve the issue confronting the parties. The precise issue confronting the
parties is whether the district court erred in dismissing Davis’s claim for
failure to exhaust when Fort Bend County did not timely assert an
8

Davis, 893 F.3d at 306-08.
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exhaustion defense. That issue can and should be resolved directly by resort
to statutory construction, common-law traditions, and administrative
policy. As I explain below, that issue should not—and perhaps cannot—be
resolved by determining the exhaustion requirement’s jurisdictional
character.
In some of the Court’s jurisdictional-characterization cases, the Court
has taken a jurisdiction-first approach of deciding the jurisdictional
character of a rule in order to define its effects. In Bowles v. Russell, for
example, the Court held that the deadline to file a notice of appeal in a civil
case is jurisdictional and therefore not subject to equitable exceptions.9 The
Court engaged no separate analysis of the deadline’s effects; the
jurisdictional holding automatically led to the determination that equitable
exceptions were not allowed.
This jurisdiction-first approach assumes that jurisdictional rules have
immutable and defined characteristics, namely, that they are not subject to
principles of equity, discretion, estoppel, forfeiture, consent, or waiver, and
courts must police them sua sponte at all times prior to final judgment. The
jurisdiction-first approach also assumes that nonjurisdictional rules have (at
least presumptively) the inverse effects of jurisdiction.10 These assumptions
underlying the jurisdiction-first approach are flawed. In truth, the
jurisdictional characterization of a rule does not inexorably define its
effects.
The flaw is easier to appreciate with nonjurisdictional rules.
Nonjurisdictional rules can have effects typically associated with
jurisdictional rules, such as being nonwaivable or unsusceptible to equitable
exceptions.11 Indeed, although exhaustion requirements are often treated as
nonjurisdictional preconditions to suit, those exhaustion requirements
nevertheless often exhibit jurisdiction-like effects.12 The point is that
9

Bowles, 551 U.S. at 212-14.
See, e.g., Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205 (2006) (“A statute of limitations
defense . . . is not ‘jurisdictional,’ hence courts are under no obligation to raise the time bar
sua sponte.”) (original emphasis); id. at 213 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that ordinary
time-bar defenses “are nonjurisdictional and thus subject to waiver and forfeiture”).
11
See Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008).
12
See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984) (“We agree with the
Court of Appeals that the [habeas] exhaustion rule requiring dismissal of mixed petitions,
though to be strictly enforced, is not jurisdictional.”); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129,
133 (1987) (holding that appellate courts have discretion to consider a habeas petitioner’s
10
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nonjurisdictional
rules—including
nonjurisdictional
exhaustion
requirements—can have jurisdiction-like effects that might make them
nonforfeitable or mandatory.13
Although harder to appreciate, the flip side is true as well: jurisdictional
rules can have nonjurisdictional effects, in myriad ways. 14 Most pertinent
to Fort Bend County is the species of “jurisdictional preconditions,” in
which an event or action is required to confer jurisdiction. Though such a
precondition is a predicate to jurisdiction, the precondition itself need not
be unwaivable or incurable or inexcusable.15 For example, while appellate
jurisdiction in a civil case requires a timely notice of appeal, 16 what
constitutes an effective “notice” is subject to judicial discretion.17 Similarly,
while appellate jurisdiction in a habeas case requires the issuance of a
certificate of appealability,18 certain defects in the certificate can be cured
or forfeited.19
As for exhaustion requirements, the Court has characterized some as
prerequisites to jurisdiction, but not always with all of the usual attributes
of jurisdictionality. For example, the statutory requirement that socialsecurity claimants receive a final decision from the Social Security
Commissioner before filing a claim in federal court20 is a “jurisdictional
prerequisite” that contains “a waivable element [that] the administrative
failure to exhaust even if the State did not assert the defense); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3)
(providing that the habeas exhaustion requirement cannot be forfeited by the State); Jones
v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211-16 (2007) (holding the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement to be
mandatory but an affirmative defense that must be asserted in the answer).
13
E.g., Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, No. 17-1094, slip op. at 4 (2019) (“Whether a
rule precludes equitable tolling turns not on its jurisdictional character but rather on
whether the text of the rule leaves room for such flexibility.”).
14
See Scott Dodson, Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1437 (2011).
15
Id. at 1463-65.
16
See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).
17
See Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 765 (2001) (allowing an appellant to
correct a defective notice of appeal); Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 245 (1992) (treating an
appellate brief as a notice of appeal); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962) (deeming
a notice of appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate to be a notice of appeal from the
underlying judgment).
18
See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).
19
See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 143-45 (2012) (“A defective COA is not
equivalent to the lack of any COA.”).
20
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
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remedies provided by the [Commissioner] be exhausted.”21 A claimant’s
failure to comply with this waivable part of the exhaustion requirement is
also excusable by the courts even absent the Commissioner’s waiver.22
The teaching of these cases is that the jurisdictional characterization of
an exhaustion requirement does not conclusively determine whether an
exhaustion defect can be cured by a party, forfeited by the other party, or
enforced by a district court despite party forfeiture.
For that reason, resolving the jurisdictional character of Title VII’s
exhaustion requirement in Fort Bend County cannot itself resolve whether
the district court correctly dismissed Davis’s unexhausted claim. If the
exhaustion requirement is a jurisdictional precondition, it might still be
forfeitable or excusable or curable. If the exhaustion requirement is
nonjurisdictional, it might still be mandatory or enforceable despite the
circumstances. Resolving the jurisdictional issue simply does not answer
the real question confronting the parties: whether the district court was
correct to dismiss for failure to exhaust.
III. A BETTER WAY FORWARD
Rather than take a jurisdiction-first approach, the Court should take an
effects-based approach that avoids the jurisdictional issue and instead
construes the effects of the rule directly. The Court has taken such an
approach before. In Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,23 the Court was
presented with the question of whether RCRA’s 60-day notice requirement
was a limit on federal subject-matter jurisdiction. However, the Court
declined to answer that question and instead answered the narrow question
presented by the facts of the case: whether the requirement was amenable
to equitable exceptions.24 The Court answered that question directly without
addressing the jurisdictional character of the notice requirement.
Likewise, the petition for certiorari in John R. Sand asked this Court to
decide “[w]hether the statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2501 limits the
21

See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 327-30 (1976); see also Heckler v. Day,
467 U.S. 104, 110 n.14 (1984) (“The jurisdictional requirement that administrative
remedies be exhausted is waivable.”).
22
See Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 484-86 (1986).
23
493 U.S. 20 (1989).
24
Id. at 31.
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subject matter jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.”25 The precise
issue in that case, however, was whether a court must enforce the limitations
period even if the United States, as a party-defendant, waives the issue. In
its opinion, the Court rephrased the question presented to reflect these terms
and resolved that issue alone.26 In the process, this Court carefully avoided
characterizing the limitations period as jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional.27
The Court should take the approach of Hallstrom and John R. Sand in
deciding Fort Bend County. That effects-based approach, unlike a
jurisdiction-first approach, will answer the narrow and precise question
actually at hand: did the district court err in dismissing Davis’s complaint
for lack of exhaustion despite Fort Bend County’s failure to timely raise the
exhaustion issue?
I do not urge a particular answer to that question. Perhaps the
importance of Title VII exhaustion justifies the district court’s dismissal
despite Fort Bend County’s forfeiture or any considerations of equity.
Perhaps the preference for party autonomy means that Fort Bend County’s
forfeiture disables the district court from dismissing for lack of exhaustion.
Perhaps Davis’s exhaustion of her related sexual-harassment and retaliation
claims should, under the circumstances, be deemed effective exhaustion of
her religious-discrimination claim. Perhaps the district court should have
exercised discretion to stay the case to allow Davis an opportunity to
exhaust the religious-discrimination claim.
The right answer will depend upon ordinary principles of statutory
construction, common-law traditions, and administrative policy. It need
not—should not—depend upon jurisdictional characterization.

25

Pet. Br. at i, John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, No. 06-1164, 2007 WL
2236607 (Aug. 3, 2017).
26
John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 132 (2008).
27
Id. at 133-35 (characterizing the time bar as a “more absolute” bar that justifies
departure from usual waiver rules); cf. id. at 134 (suggesting that prior cases’ use of the
term “jurisdictional” was “[a]s convenient shorthand”).
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